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COMMENTS
The Duty of Loyalty of a Trustee
Where one of two persons holds the character of a trustee
or a character analogous thereto such as an agent, guardian or the
like, and stands in such a position that he has rights or powers which
he is bound to exercise for the other person, the so-called fiduciary
relation exists. Cases defining and limiting this relation are legion.1
But courts of Equity have carefully refrained from setting bounds
to the principles which control those in fiduciary capacities for by
retaining this elasticity they have been able to extend their appli-
cability to all devices invented by unfaithful fiduciaries. 2  It is set-
tled by an overwhelming weight of authority that the principle ex-
tends to every possible case in which the fiduciary relation exists as a
tact,o in which there is confidence reposed on the one side and the
resulting advantage on the other.4 The relations and duties involved
in it need not be legal, they may be moral, social, domestic or merely
personal.' The term fiduciary or confidential relation is a very broad
one, and where it is found, obligations such as the duty of loyalty
and prohibition against self-dealing are enforced. These obligations
and their enforcement vary in strictness with the degree of the quality
ot the relationship. The origin of the confidence and the source of
the influence are immaterial. The rule embraces both technical fidu-
ciary relations and those informal relations which exist whenever one
man implicitly relies upon the judgment of another, the only cri-
terion being that such relation exists in fact.'
-SC., WORDS AND PHRASS Vol. 16, p. 513 et seq.
2NebrasT;a Power Co. v. Koenig, 93 Neb. 68, 139 N. W 839 (1913); Hivck v.
V'rschel, 171 Okla. 17, 40 P. 2d 1077 (1935); Ptckett v. Dyer, 203 N. C. 684, 167 S. E.
43 (1932).
Po:IEIo,', Ell. JtR. See. 956; Roby v. Colehaur, 135 Ill. 30. 25 N. E. 777 (1890)-
Studybaker v. Cofield, 159 M.%o. 596, 61 S. W. 246 (1901); Rollison v. 'Muir, 163 Okla.
266, 21 P. (2d.) 1062 (1933); Selle v. Wrigley, 233 Mo. App. 43, 116 S. IV (2d) 217
221 (1938).
40'Donnell v. Snowden & M.IcSwecney, 237 Ill. App. 156 (1925); Dale v. Jennings,
90 Fla. 234, 107 So. 175 (1925).
5Beach v. Wilton, 244 Ill. 413, 91 N. E. 492 (1910), Quoting 2 PoMEROY EQ. JuR.
(3rd Ed.) See. 956; Henson v. Cooksey, 237 II. 620, 86 N. E. 1107, 1109 (1908); Beare
v. Wright, 14 N. D. 26, 29, 103 N. W. 632, 69 L. R. A. 409 (1905); Comnmercial Mer-
chants Nat. Bank and Trust Co. v. loth, 360 I1. 294, 196 N. E. 214 (1935).
6 - Pot. EQ. TuR. S5e. 955.
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The force and effect of this principle can be best determined by
a brief survey of its application in allied fields of the law
Adinsnstrator-Heir" E-ecutor-Legatee. Administrators and
executors owe to heirs and legatees a duty which requires them to
handle the estate in such a way that they will not make a profit from
it. As illustrative of this we find that the general rule is that sales
by executors or administrators to themselves either directly or in-
directly are voidable within a reasonable time ;7 their liability in
this respect is not dissimilar from that of trustees.8 Other courts
hold such sales to be absolutely void.9 If creditors hive reduced
their claims to judgments against the estate they can file a bill to
set aside the sale by the executor or administrator to himself,' and
if he has resold the property he must account for the proceeds.1
Guardian-Ward. Equity requires the utmost good faith in all
transactions between guardian and ward.12  The guardian must pro-
tect the ward's estate and is not allowed to make any profit on it
outside that which is lawfully allowed him for administering the
estate.' 3 He may not trade with himself on account of the ward,
or use or deal with the ward's property for his own benefit.' 4
Attorney-Client. When advising his client, and conducting
the latter's affairs, an attorney is bound to conduct himself as a
fiduciary occupying a high position of confidence and fidelity In
all of his relations with his client it is his duty -to exercise and
maintain the utmost good faith, integrity, and fairness."
I Among the numerous cases so holding, See Murphy v. Teter, 56 Ind. 545 (1877);
Verdun v. Barr, 253 I1. 120, 97 N. E. 239 (1911); Anderson v. Green, 46 Ga. 361, 379
(1872); Mock v. Pleasants, 34 Ark. 63, 72 (1879); Ebelmesser v. Ebelmesser, 99 Il.
541, 548 (1881).
8Rafferty v. Mallory, 3 Biss. 362, 367, 20 Fed. Cases 166 (1872).
9Forbes v. Halsey, 26 N. Y. 53, 65 (1862); Lotham v. Barney, 14 Fed. 433, 442
C1882); Aronstein v. Irvine, 49 La. An. 1478 (1897).
'0Elting v. F. N. B., 173 IIl. 368, 383, 50 N. E. 1095 (1898).
"Elting v. F. N. B., Supra.
12Pevehouse v. Adams, 52 Okla. 495, 153 P. 65 (1915); Dolbeare v. B.wser,
254 Mass. 57, 149 N. E. 626 (1925).
13Brandau v. Greer, 95 Miss. 100, 48 So. 519 (1909); Showalter v. Hampton, 101
Okla. 83, 223 P 167 (1923); Clay v. Butler, 132 Va. 464, 112 S. E. 697 (1922); In rc
'Montgomery's Estate, 140 Wash. 51, 248 P. 64 (1926).
4Charles v. Witt, 88 Kan. 484 ,129 F. 140 (1913); Sowers v. Pollack, 112 Kan. 599,
212 P. 103 (1923); Berry v. Berry (Mo. App.) 218 S. NV. 691 (1920); Milner v. Hare.
wood, 18 Ves. 258, 274 (1811).
"SCommonwealth Finance Corp. v. McHarg, (C. C. A. N. Y.) 282 F. 560 (1922);
Parkerson v. Borst, 264 F 761 (C. C. A. La.) (1920) cert. denied Putnam v. Borst, 41 S.
Ct. 8, 254 U. S. 634 (1920); Bryant v Lewis, (Tex. Civ. App.) 27 S. W (2d) 6114.
607 (1930); Wallach v. Rabinowitz, 200 N. v 646, 185 Wis. 115 (1924).
OMAIENTS
Partncrs Inter Se. In the partnership relation the duty to di-
vulge all material and relevant information is apparent." A part-
ne must not compete in a similar enterprise, '" if he does, Equity
will restrain him,18 and his copartner can require an accounting for
profits.10 One partner may not appropriate to his own use a re-
newal of a lease, though the term is to begin at the expiration of
the partnership.! "  One case 21 has gone so far as to say "There is
no stronger fiduciary relation known to the law than that of a co-
partnership," but this honorary phrase is usually accorded the rela-
tion of trustee cestut que trust.
Corporations. The fiduciary duty of a director and officer to the
corporation prevents him from obtaining any unfair advantage or
profit for himself by misrepresentation, undue influence or con-
cealment. A director may not deal with his corporation at arm's
length.-- Similarly with respect to dealings in corporate stock,
there is authority for holding the director to fiduciary standards as
to the effect of his so dealing upon the stockholders. At one time
the existence of such fiduciary relation was demed."- The niore
recent trend is codified as to any "Equity security" which is regis-
tered on a national security exchange. This denies to directors.
,,fficers and large stockholders the right to profit from short term
13Yorks v. Tozer, 59 2linn. 78, 60 N. W. 846 (1894); McGrath v. Cowen, 57 Ohio
St. 35, 49 X. E. 33S (1595); Poss v. Gottlieb, 118 Misc. 318, 193 N. Y. S. 418 (1922).
11 Dcnrni v. Gordcn, i163 Cal. 427, 125 Pac. 1063 (1912).
13 Marchall and Co. v. Johnon, 33 Ga. 500 (iM63).
11 McMahon v. McClernan, 10 W Va. 419 (1877).
" Lcach v. Leach, 18 Pick. 68, 76 (Mass.) (1836); Mitchell v. R cd, 61 N. Y. 123,
19 Am. Rlp. 252 (1874); Lurie v. Pinanski, 215 M s. 229 (1913).
2- Sahlinger v. Sahlinger, 56 Wash. 134, 105 F. 236 (1909).
SBALLAN TT5-z A : LATTI; , CAsrs AND 'MATERIALS Ox Timr LAw OF CorORTIO.'s,
(1939) p. 172; Elliot v. Baker, 194 Mass. 518, 80 N. E. 450 (1907); 3 FLETCHeR, CYCLo.
)EO.%IA CoyiroAT NoS, (Perm. Ed.) Sec. 838; M.xARowE'z, PPIVATa COrPORAT oNs (2nd Ed.)
Sec. 516 (1,06); Gray v. Cornelius, 40 F (2d) 67 (D. C. Ol:la. lO.O); SPFLI.MAN,
.50,~:APDirrc-ors p. 14 (1931).3 Oiiver v. Oliver, 11 Ga. 362. 45 S. E. 232 (1903); McManu. v. Durant. foS App,
D)iv. 643, 154 N. Y. S. 580 (1915); Sautter v. Fulnxr, 258 N. Y. 107, 179 N. E. 310
41932); Stcx:art v. Harris, 69 Kans. 498, 77 P. 277 (1904). Earlier cases denying e.ist.
,nce -t such a duty- Board of Com'rs. v. Reynolds, 44 Ind. 509; 15 Am. Rep. 245 (1873);
lfoski-r v. Midland Steel Co., 215 111. 444, 74 N. E. 445 (1905); Carpenter v. Danforth.
L2 Barb. (N. Y.) 551 (1868). To find a review of cases up to 1910, see Wilgus,
Furchz, of Shares of Corporafian by a Director from a Shareholder, (1910) 8
Mcii. L. Rav. 267. Arkansas has consistently ruled that directors are liable to share-
holders directly for loss caused to them by the official misconduct of the directors,
hetlier the loss occurs in the handling of corporate shares or not. Bank of Des. Arc
v. Aloody, 110 Ark. 39, 161 S. W. 134 (1913), Bank of Commerce v. Goolsby, 129 Ark.
41r, 196 S. W 134 (1917); Muller v. Planter's Bank & Trust Co., 169 Ark. 430, 275 S.
WV 7 0 (125); lohnson v. Coleman, 17) Ark. 1057, 20 S, W, (2d) I6 (1920).
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dealings in the securities of their corporations.2 ' Within the corp-
oration itself, the shareholders may not wilfully injure the interests
of other shareholders. The actions of the majority shareholders are
subject to the rights of the minority shareholders in such trans-
actions as sale of assets, consolidation, merger, dissolution, ex-
changes of shares, and amendment of articles.2 5
Agency. The rule on which the doctrine of undivided loyalty
is based is found in the field of agency This rule is that a maii
cannot serve two masters.2 6  So an agent occupying a place-of trust
and confidence is not permitted to put himself in a position in which
his personal inferests may come in conflict with his duty to his prin-
cipal. He cannot assume a position which may afford the temptation
to subordinate the interests of his principal to those of himself in the
discharge of his duty In order to free him from temptation he is
disabled from placing himself in such position.2 7  Although the issue
is rarely litigated, it has been held that a principal also owes a duty
of good faith to his agent.2
8
Coadventurers. Probably the most famous case holding joint ad-
venturers to a high degree of loyalty is Meinhard v Salmon"
fudge Cardoza said, "Joint adventurers like copartners owe to one
another while the enterprise continues the duty of the finest loyalty
21 Federal Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (MASON'S U. S. CoDY, Tit. 15 c. 16 a See.
16). Textwriters favor the view that due to the inequality of the positions ot the di
rcctor or officer and shareholder, if special circumstances affecting the value of the s tock
exist, tie nondisclosing director or officer will be liable. See Thornton, The Trust Ret1-
tion between Corporate Officers and Stockholders, Buying of, or Selling Their Sto, to
Them, (1908) 67 CFNT. L. 1. 452; 3 FLETCIIER, CYc. CORPORATIONS (Pcrni Ed.) Sees.
2564-2567; Berle, Publicity of Accounts and Director's Purchase of Stock, f1927) 25
'Micii. L. REV. 827; Smith, Purchase of Shares of Corporation by a Director trot a
Stockholder, (1921) 19 M cH. L. REv. 698; Laylin, Duty of a Director Purchcs _, Shares
of Stock, (1917) 27 YALE L. J. 731; see Wilgus' article Supra n. 23. Contra: Walk.r.
Duty of Disclosure By a Director Purchasing Stock front his Stockhrlders, (1923) 32 YALr
L. J. 637.
2 See Lattin, Equitable Limitations on Statutory or Charter Powers Gizren to Majority
Stockholders, (1932) 30 MicH. L. REv. 645; Kavanaugh v. Kavanaugh Knitting Co., 226
N. Y. 185, 123 N. E. 148 (1919); Wright v. Oroville Gold, Silver & Copper Min. Co., 40
Cal. 20, 27 (1870); Lebold v. Inland S. S. Co., 82 F. (2d) 351, 354 (C. C. A. 1936);
Outwater v. Public Service Corp. of New Jersey, 103 N. J. Eq. 461, 143 At. 72 (1928).
28 Lum v. McEwen, 56 Minn. 278, 57 N. W. 662 (1894).
'7 Pratt v. Shell Petroleum Corporation, 100 F. (2d) 833 (1938) cert. denied 306 U. S.
659, S9 S. Ct. 775 (1939); United States v. Carter, 217 U. S. 286, 30 S. Ct. 515 (1910);
Daus v. Short, 169 Iowa 1, 150 N. W. 1047 (1915); Lucey v. Vilhauer, 64 S. D. 54, 264
N. W. 203 (1935).
23 MeLeod v. Gaither, 94 Fla. 55, 113 So. 687 (1927).
SMeiemhard v. Salmon, 249 N. Y. 458, 164 N. E. 545 (1928) accord as to fiduciary
duties of joint adventurers. Menefee v. Oxnam, 42 Cal. App. 81, 183 Pac. 370 (1919);
Church v. Odell, 100 Minn. 98, 110 N. W. 346 (1907).
t OMMENTS
.Many forms of conduct permissible in a workaday world for those
acting at arm's length are forbidden to those bound by fiduciary
ties. A trustee is held to something stricter than the morals of the
market place. Not honesty alone but the punctilio of an honor the
most sensitive is then the standard of behavior. As to this there
has developed a tradition that is unbending and inveterate. A
compromising rigidity has been the attitude of courts of Equity
when petitioned to undermine the rule of undivided loyalty by the
'disintegrating erasion of particular exceptions' only thus has the
level of conduct for fiduciaries been kept at a level higher than that
trodden by the crowd." :"
Trustee-Cestuz Que Trust. The foregoing duties apply with
unmitigated vigor to the trustee, cestin que trust status which is
a fiduciary relation of the highest order.3 Judge Davis in a very
strong opinion, Barker v First National Bank of Birnngham.
relying upon 11cznlhard v Salmon 32 had this to say of the conduct
required of a trustee "The relation between a trustee-cestui que
trust is the most intense fiduciary relation in our law The trustee
is required to use the skill of a person of ordinary intelligence.
and if he possess more skill than that of the ordinary person, he
must use the skill that he has at his command. In all his acts as
trustee, he must display complete loyalty to the interests of the
cestui que trust. .All persona! or selfish interesIs and all considera-
ion of the interests of third parties must be excluded. His must
be an undivided loyalty " This most tundamental of all duties
owed by the trustee to the cesti que trust arises not by virtue of
provisions in the trust instrument, but rather because of the relation-
ship arising from the creation of the trust."a  Professor Bogert in
his work Trusts and Trustees -" points out some reasons why this
rigorous standard of conduct has been imposed. The trustee has an
'Mcinhard v. Salmon, n. 29 Svpra. at page 460.
"The fiduciary relation has been defined as one in ahiuch "if a wrong arises the same
r~mcdy e:xists against the wrongdoer on behalf of the principal as would exist against a
trustce on behalf of a ccstut auL trust." City of Boston v. Santosuosso, 298 Mass. 175.
10 N. E. (2d.) 271, 275; Carr v. Streeter, 262 Mass. 595, 160 N. E. 405, 407 (1937),;
Central Nati. Bank v. Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co., 104 U. S. 54, 68, 26 L. Ed. 693
(1881); Niland v. Kennedv, 316 I1. 253, 147 N. E. 117 (1925).
" Supra, n. 29.
"Barker v. National Bank, 20 F Supp. 185 (D. C. N. D. Ala. 1937); See 2 SCorr,
TrUSTs 227.
712 SCOTT, TrsvsTs Sec. 170, p. 856, "In some relations the fiduciary emitnt is more
irtl ne than others; it is peculiarly intense in the case of the trust."
" 3 Pnci PT. Ttrss A.,p TrUsTrrs Sec. 493, p. 1560-1561.
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intimate knowledge of the financial affairs of the cestut que trust
and can easily win his confidence, because of the trustee's superior
position there is, first, a great opportunity for the exercise of fraud
and undue influence, and second, difficulty of proof on the part of
the cestui que trust that an unfair advantage has been taken of him.
As a result of this latter fact, when a question arises between trus-
tee and a beneficiary, or when confidential relations exist between
any two persons, resulting in one having an influence over the other
andj a business transaction takes place between them, resulting in a
benefit to the person holding the influential position, the lay pre-
sumes everything against the transaction and casts the burden of
proof upon the person benefited to show that the confidential rela-
tion has been to that transaction at least, suspended, and that it
was fairly conducted as if between strangers.a6
The same high standard which is today required of trustees is
one of the fairly ancient and best established principles of Equity.
In 1726, the famous Rumford Market case817 held that at the ex-
piration of a lease held by the trustee for the benefit of the cestuz
que trust, even though the lessor refused to renew the lease, the
trustee could not procure a lease for his own benefit. The court
said " he (the trustee) should have let it run out than to have
had the lease to himself, the trustee is the only person of all
mankind who might not have had the lease." When the fiduciary
obtains property under such a lease, or in some other way gains a
benefit as the result of his capacity as fiduciary, the principal has a
remedy, for in this and similar situations, the constructive trust
affords relief.38
'02 JONES, COMM55.ENTARIES ON EVlDExCE Sec. 549, p. I010; Jones v. Lloyd, 117 Ill. 597.
7 N. E. 119 (1886) (trustee); Trce v. Comstock, 121 Fed. 620, 61 L. R. A. 179 (1903)
(agent); Nelson v. Matsch, 38 Utah 122, 110 Pac. 865 (1910); Ann Cas. 1912 D. 1242 and
note (partner); Pacific Ry. Co. v. Ketchum, 101 U. S. 289, 25 L. ed. 932 (1879) (attor-
ney). In re Williamns' Estate, 50 Ore. 179, 92 Pac. 118 (1907) (executor); Chorpen-
ning's Appeal, 32 Pa. St. 315, 72 Am. Dec. 789 (1858) (guardian).
5Keech v. Sandford, Chancery 1726, Selo. Cas. Ch. 61.
SBotkm v. Pyle, 91 Colo. 221, 14 P. (2d.) 187 (1932); Parkes v. Burkhart, 10i
Wash. 659, 172 P. 908 (1918); Bryan v. McCaskill, 284 Mo. 583, 225 S. W 683 (1920);
Frick v. Cane, 160 Misc. 450, 290 N. Y. S. 592 (1936) (trustee). Walley v. '%Valley.
I Vern. 484 (1687); Holt v. Holt, 1 Ch. Cas. 190 (1670) (executor). Leach v. Leach.
18 Pick 68 (Mass. 1836); Lane v. Pinansk, 215 Mass. 229, 102 N. E. 629 (1913);
Mitchell v. Reed, 61 N. Y. 123, 19 Am. Rep. 541 (1874) (partners). Essey Trust Co. v.
Enwright, 214 Mass. 507, 102 N. E. 441 (1913); Davis v. Hamlin, 108 Ill. 39, 48 Am. Rep.
541 (1883) (agents). Girard v. Lamoureux, 227 Mass. 277, 116 N. E. 572 (1917); Paw
Paw Savings Bank v. Free, 205 Mich. 52, 171 N. AV. 464 (1919) (corporate officers).
As to the purchase of a reversion See, Anderson v. Lemon, 8 N. Y. 236 (1853). There
has been some question whether the same rule should be applied. See discussion in
lUMMENTS
Although the principle itselt has long been applied, the phrase
"duty of undivided loyalty" apparently was coined by the late Mr.
Justice Cardoza.30 It was in 1926 when he was a judge on the New
York Court of Appeals that he said, "Only by this uncompromising
rigidity has the rule of undivided loyalty been maintained against
disintegrating erosion." But an amazingly rapid adoption of the
expression by the legal profession has followed."
The Supreme Court of Ohio recently had occasion to make ap-
plication of these principles in two important cases.
The first of these was In re Estate of Binder4 1 decided June 5,
194o. A banking and trust company was appointed trustee of an
estate by a trust instrument which gave to the trustee broad powers
to manage the estate. Seven investment transactions were in ques-
tion, in five of which the trustee was held to have violated the duty
of loyalty, but in the other two no self-dealing was found. The
trustee was a large corporation holding multiple trusts representing
assets ranging from $15O,OOO,OOO to $23o,oooooo. The following
principles pertaining to the duty of loyalty were laid down by the
court. (I) The transfer of securities not infected by breach of
trust at their inception by one who is a trustee of more than one
trust from one of the trusts to another, if done in good faith, is
permissible in Ohio. (2) A trustee may set up an independent trust
in property other than his own and issue land trust certificates to
the various trusts of which he is a trustee. (3) A trustee may ad-
vance money to purchase securities for a trust provided such securi-
ties are immediately allocated. (4) A trustee may not invest trust
money in securities in which he is interested and may not buy or
sell trust property, thereby gaining for himself a profit. (5) De-
partmental banks are single corporate entities, therefore transactions
majority and minority opinions in Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N. Y. 458 (1928). In Beatty
v. Guggenheim Exploration Co., 225 N. Y. 380, 122 N. E. 378 (1919), at pace 3S6 of the
New York Reports, Judge Cardoza expressed this principle in an otten quoted passage.
le said, "A constructive trust is the formula through which the conscience of equity
finds expression. When property has been acquired in such circumstances that the holder
of legal title may not in good conscience retain the beneficial interest, Equity converts
him into a trustee."
" Wendt v. Fischer, 243 N. Y. 439, 154 N. E. 303 (1926).
0 e. g. See Shepard's New York Court of Appeals Citations, (1941), where it is indi.
cated that the case of Meinhard v. Salmon (See Su'pra. n. 27) where Judge Cardoza so
ably expressed this concept has been cited 128 times in this connection in New York and
Federal cases alone.
" 137 Ohio St. 26, 27 N. E. (2d) 939, 17 Ohio Ops. 364 (1940).
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between the separate departments constitute self-dealing which is
not excused by broad terms in the instrument.
The second case is In re Trusteeship of Stone- decided May 28,
i94i. Transactions similar to those of the Binder case were the
source of the litigation. In each case the successor trustee represent-
ing the various trusts took exceptions to the accounts of the former
trustees filed in the Probate Court. The judges of the Court of
Appeals of the First Appellate District sitting by designation in the
Eighth Appellate District certified the judgment they rendered as a
court in the Binder case to the Supreme Court as being in conflict
with the judgment of the Court of Appeals in this, the Stone case.
The Supreme Court reaffirmed its position in the Binder case on
certain issues in which the cases are alike, and in addition announced
the following principles which had not been necessary to the previous
decision. (I) A trustee commits an act of disloyalty when it makes
purchases for the trust of certificates of participation in a mortgage
trust fund which consists of mortgages individually owned by it as
mortgagee plus others held by it as trustee. (2) A corporate trustee
may not acquire or retain its own shares in a trust unless specifically
authorized by the instrument or a provision of law 43 (3) To bind
the beneficiary of a trust he must not only be aware of all the mate-
rial facts but must also be advised of his legal rights. judge Vil-
liams wrote a concurring opinion in which he expressed himself as
thinking that the trust company was authorized by the instrument
to retain the shares, but when the former trust company merged
with others to form a new trust company the right to retain was
lost." judge Hart concurred in part but dissented as to the part
42 138 Ohio St. 293, 34 N. E. (2d) 755 (1941).
48 The Court of Appeals in passing on this question said: "In our judgment, the will
gave ample authority for the trustee to retain the stock." Opinion of the Court of
Appeals, filed in the Supreme Court, July 29, 1939. (No Statute is directly applicable.)
" "Where a trustee on the creation of the trust receives securities which are not
proper trust investments it is his duty to dispose of them wihin a reasonable time and
invest the proceeds in securities which are proper trust investments, unless it is other-
wise provided by the terms of the instrument." 2 SCOTT, TRUSTS Sec. 230, citing Cameron
Trust Co. v. Leibrandt, 229 Mo. App. 450, 83 S. W. (2d) 234 (1935); Babbitt v. Fidelity
Trust Co., 72 N. J. Eq. 745, 66 Atl. 1076 (1907); Citizens & Southern National Bank
v. Clark, 172 Ga. 625, 158 S. E. 297 (1931). Where a trustee is authorized to retain
certain securities but is not authorized to purchase similar securities and owing to a
merger, new securities are issued in place of old there is i4 question whether the trustve
can properly receive and retain the new." 2 ScoTT, TRUSTS Sec. 231.4, citing Ini rc
Morris, 54 L. J. Ch. 388 (1885); Hewitt v. Hewitt, 113 N. J. Eq. 299, 166 Atl. 528
(1931). Yes, if substantially similar, In re New, (1901) 2 Ch. 534; In re Smith, (1902)
2 Ch. 667.
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ut the opinion which held that the retention of the stock was un-
authorized and also held that the beneficiaries were estopped.4a
Certainly the economic conditions since World War I have made
this an important period in the law of trusts. In keeping with the
high degree of faith required by a fiduciary many courts have decided
that to err on the side of requiring too much of him in whom an-
other's financial welfare rests is preferable to lenience paralleled in
other fields of the law to meet the demands for increased efficiency
of a growing business world. Throughout this discussion there will
be evidenced a severe conflict between the somewhat inflexible rules
of equity and the demands of business efficiency made necessary by
the phenomenal growth in number of first, corporate trustees, and
second, trust estates handled by the corporate trustees. In a number
of cases the courts have expressed the opinion that a corporate trus-
tee, a bank or trust company, may be held to a higher degree of
skill than that which is required of individual trustees.46 An eminent
jurist has said "the first requirement of a sound body of law is that
it should correspond with actual feelings and demands of the com-
munity whether right or wrong."'-'  But in the case of trusts, con-
formity of the law "with actual feelings and demands of the com-
munity" if they can be measured by the feelings of those who ad-
nminster the majority of trust estates, namely corporate trustees, cer-
tainly means a revision of our thinking along lines previously as-
sumed immutable.
The court was confronted with the problem of a transfer of
securities by a trustee of several trusts from one to the other.
Should Ohio abide by the prophylactic rule of law and entirely
prohibit inter-trust transfers, or should an occasional flagrant mis-
use of discretion be risked in the interests of efficiency? The Su-
preme Court of Ohio has apparently decided that freedom to trustees
of multiple trusts is the lesser of the two evils. In the Binder case
at page 35, the court says. "Trust companies perform a great service
in the business world and the law must not make the rules of conduct
so onerous that they may not function."
' Judge Hart's partial dis,,eit is consider.d in more detail later.
* Villard v. Villard, 219 N. Y. 482, 114 N. E. 789 (1916); Will of Church, 221 Wis.
472, 266 N. W. 210 (1936); 1; re Estate of Bushy, 288 IIl. App. 500, 6 N. E. (2d) 451
1937).
4' OLIVER WFNDrLL HOL-AES, Jr., TitE Com to. LAw p. 41.
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The Binder case holds such transactions to be valid"8 unless the
securities are vice infected at their inception,4' and if the trustee can
justify the transaction as being fair to each trust. 0 In so finding,
the courts say that the trustee's incentive to personal profits by in-
dividual transactions with the trust is absent, therefore, the rule
against self-dealing does not obtain. But it is difficult to fit this
trend logically with one of the most fundamental concepts of law, i. e.
that a man cannot serve two masters.5' Here the trustee is faced
with irreconcilable duties, for when he buys for a trust he is charged
with the duty of getting the lowest price, and when he sells the
property of a trust it is his unquestionable duty to get the highest
possible price. It is certainly not inconceivable that he could act
for the better interests of both trusts in the open market. Barker v
First National Bank of Bu'mnghamn is one of the leading cases which
has refused to "create this dangerously erosive exception to the
rigid principles of trust law" . Certainly this rigid standard would
remove the temptation to transfer securities from a trust whose
account is due to one whose accounting day is more remote.5 3
Corporate trustees who have the responsibility of handling a large
number of small trusts are faced with a serious problem of finding
sound investments for small sums of money Should they be allowed
to acquire participating securities for these small trusts ? The land
trust certificates purchased by the trustees for the trusts in the Binder
and Stoine cases, like mortgages are real estates securities, but unlike
mortgages and bonds, at the time of the creation of the Stone and
Binder trusts, they were not subject to a personal property tax, and
therefore had a greater earning capacity "1 Were they valid trust
investments? Two features of the land trusts certificates here in-
48 Trust-to-trust transactions were held legal by an appellate court in Ohio in Lima
First American Trust Co. v. Graham, 54 Ohio App. 85 at 96 (1936), but the Binder case
is the first case in which the Supreme Court has passed on this question.
0 In. re Estate of Binder, 137 Ohio St. 27, pt. 2 of Syllabus.
10 RESTATExENT, TRUSTS (1935) Sec. 170, comment q. Springfield Safe Dcp. Co. v,
First Unitarian Society, 293 lass. 480, 200 N. E. 541 (1936); French v. Hall, 196' Mass.
147, 83 N. E. 438 (1908); First National Bank of Birmingham v. Basham, 233 Ala. 500,
191 So. 873 (1939); U. S. Natl. Bank and Trust Co. of Kenasha v. Sullivan, 69 F. (2d)
412 (1934); 2 ScoTT, TRUSTS Sec. 170.16.
5 1 Supra n. 26.
13Barker v. First National Bank of Birmingham, 20 F. Supp. 185 (1937) p. 190.
UNIFORx TRUSTS AcT. See. 6 provides, "No trustee shall as trustee of one trust sell
property to itself as trustee of another trust." This act has not been adopted m Ohio.
"See 15 CiN. L. REv. 113, 116 (1941).
First National Bank v. Rawson, 56 Ohio App. 388. Ohio G. C. 710-164: "In manage.
ment of money and property held by it as trustee, such trust company may invest such
money and property in a general trust fund of the trust company "1
i u~. IL~t)85
volved would seem to point to selt-dealing. First, the interests were
purchased in the trustee's own name. Second, they were sometimes
purchased with money advanced by the trustee. According to the
recent ruling of the Supreme Court the answer to the question in
Ohio is yes, the trustee may advance the money and take the security
in his own name. One of the earliest cases to approve the taking
of the security in the trustee's own name, followed by allocation to
the various trusts was Springfield Safe Deposit and Trust Co., trustee
v. First Unitarian Society and others.55 In this case trust funds were
combined to make the investment, and the court held it legal since
the trustee had acted in good faith even though the mortgage ran in
the trustee's own name and the only evidence of holding it in trust
or of an allocation was the entry on the corporation's books and a
participation certificate filed in the portfolio of each respective trust
,,howmg their proportionate share. Other cases have held that the
trustee in investing trust property should not take the security in
its own name.", Barker v. First Xational Bank of Bzrimnghalla. 7
,aid that if the securities were taken in the trustee's own name, no
matter how immediate or complete the allocation, it would not be
upheld. However it is entirely possible that the trustee in so advanc-
ing the money could be acting completely in the interests of the
beneficiary as where the security is a very good investment, but there
are not at the moment sufficient funds in the trust to take advantage
of the opportunity to purchase. These holdings, impossible of recon-
ciliation, point to another conflict between the past and the present.
Allowing this practice certainly runs counter to the rule that a corpo-
rate trustee breaches its duty of loyalty when it purchases for
the trust, securities which it owns or in which it has a substantial
interest."
On the point of the trustee furnishing the money for the purchase
Of the securities, Professor Scott says, "If the investment is other-
wise proper, the mere fact that the trustee advanced its own money
in the first place but acquired the mortgages for the purpose of dis-
tributing them among the trust estates administered by it, and where
: 293 Mass. 480, 200 N. E. 541 (1936).
a Mitchell v. Moore, 95 U. S. 587, 24 L. Ed. 492 (1877); Chapter House Circle v.
Hartford National Bank and Trust Company, 121 Conn. 558, 199 A. 110 (1936).
* Supra n. 52.
1- REsTATEzzT, TRUsTs Sec. 170 Comment z (1935); Joilet Trust and Savings Bank V.
Ingalls, 276 Ill. App. 445 (1934); Scott, Thc Trustee's Duty of Loyalty, 49 HARv. L. REv.
521 at 539 (1936).
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only a short interval elapses between the purchase and the distribu-
tion, there is not such self-dealing as to make the transaction im
proper." 19 Concededly, if general trust funds are valid, it is certainly
a practice aiming at expediency to allow the trustee to advance the
money, because otherwise a security which, for many small trusts may
be very sound, may disappear from the market before the trustee is
able to go through the mechanics of withdrawing a proportionate
amount from each of many trusts. If it appears that the trustee put
its own money into the investment as a convenience to the trusts,
and the allocation was made as soon as possible, indicating that the
trustee was in reality acting in the interest of the cestui que trust, the
cestui que trust would seem to be fairly well protected. Of course
the difficulty is to determine intention. Here the time elapsing be-
tween the purchase and the allotment to the trusts is a primary fac-
tor in the evidence."0 The Binder case at page 36 says, "Immediate
transfer and allocation of the securities to the trust for which they
were purchased should be made accompanied by clear evidence that
they have been so purchased and allocated. The record of the trustee
should clearly earmark the securities so as to negative any possibility
of the charge <f self-dealing." Ohio's previous stand,"' that in spite
of different departments in a bank and trust company, it is one legal
entity, was reaffirmed in the Bnder case. This is in accord with the
weight of authority 82
The Ohio court's stand in the Stone case in sustaining the suc-
cessor trustee'g exceptions to the certificates of participati6n in the
mortgage pool is in line with the rule that a trustee may not sell his
own property to the beneficiary, 63 since in the instant case the trus-
tee "selected a quantity of its own mortgages and others held by it
as trustee and placed them together in its mortgage loan depart-
ment.64 Clearly this was self-dealing.
Judge Hart's partial dissent in the Stone case was on the
C9 SCOTT, TRUSTS See. 170.14.
o,t re Dalsimer's Estate, 291 N. Y. Supp. 34, 160 Misc. 906 (1936), 251 App. Div.
385, 296 N. Y. Supp. 209 (1937), 277 N. Y. 717, 14 N. E. (2d) 218 (1938).
'l Ulmer v. Fulton, Supt., 129 Ohio St. 323, i95 N. E. 557 (1935).
62RETATEMEzT, TRUSTS Sec. 170 Comment t; fn re Trusteeship of Riordan, 21f,
Iowa 1138, 248 N. W. 21 (1933); Magruder v. Drury, 235 U. S. 106, 35 S. Ct. 77
(1914); Larson v. Security Bank and Trust Co., 178 Minn. 209, 224 N. W.V. 235 (1929).
Contra: Breedlove v. Freudenstein, 89 F. (2d) 324 (1937), discussed 37 COL. L. Rev. 1405
(1937).
63 See n. 58 Supra.
I" it re Trusteeship of Stone, n. 45 Supra. at p. 297.
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point which related to the sustaining of exceptions to the account ot
the tormer trustee with reference to the retention in the trust of
shares of its own bank stock. In spite of the very broad discretionary
powers conferred on the trustee by the trust instrument, the majority
of the court ruled that such action could not be upheld in the absence
of "specific authority to retain the bank stock." 5 Admittedly, the
beneficiaries were aware of this retention, but this is not considered
to be enough for estoppel, the beneficiary must also be advised of
his legal rights." Admitting the soundness of this rule, judge Hart
thought that under the special facts of this case the beneficiarie,
could not now complain. These facts as set out by Judge Hart are.
first, "Four of the beneficiaries of this trust accepted 48 different
dividends on the stock of the Union Trust Company in this trust
trom 1921 on. Up to 1928 the stock paid a quarterly dividend
amounting to io per cent per annum. Between January I, 1928,
and April I, 1932, dividends of 12 per cent per annum were paid.
During 1932 dividends of 7 per cent were paid. From January I,
I921, to the date the bank closed, February 27, 1933, these four
beneficiaries received by way of income distribution dividends on
the bank stock held in the trust of 125 per cent of the par value of
the stock. All of them held stock of the Union Trust Company in
their own right up to the time the bank closed and some of them
purchased additional stock of the Union Trust Company while the
trust was being administered."", Certainly it would have been
difficult to have found an investment during those years which would
have yielded better returns. The beneficiaries acquiesced readily in
the retention of these shares until the profits dropped off, not due
to a change in the course of dealing of the trustee, but due to a
world-wide depression. Should they be heard now on the plea that
in spite of the fact that they were aware of all material facts, that
they were not advised of their legal rights" One must remember
that herein there are two equities to be considered, that of the bene-
ficiaries who fared so well over a period of 12 years before "the
crash" as against the creditors of the bank. Judge Hart's position
seems to be well taken.
c * Sfra n. 42 at p. 304.
1112t re Shaw's Estate, 122 N. J. Eq. 536, 195 A. 526 (1937); Re Long Island Loan
and Trust Co., 92 App. Div. 1, 87 N. Y. S. 65 (1904); It re Tuttle's Estate, 162 Misc.
286, 294 N. Y. S. 230 (1937); Gates v. Plainfield Trust Co., 121 N. J. Eq. 460, 191
X. 304 (1937).
' S: pra n. 42 at p. 310.
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Ohio in the Stone and Binder cases shows it is favoring the
stringent standards applicable to fiduciary relations and that self-
dealing will not be permitted, with a slight deviation which permits
inter-trust transactions by a multiple trustee, and the purchase of
securities in the trustee's own name and with the trustee's own
money, when such dealings are fair to any trust concerned.08
S. L. W
s In Ohio the Legislature on January Ist, 1932, gave statutory recognition to the duty
of individual loyalty always recognized by the courts. Onio G. C. 10506-49 pro'ides:
"Fiduciaries shall not buy from or sell to themselves nor shall they in their sndividual
capacities have any dealings with, the Estate, any power in the instrument not withstand-
ing." This statute was passed after the Binder and Stone trusts were established. awl
therefore had no application in these cases.
